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Preface
In the current global financial crisis, economists and policymakers have
reembraced Big Government as a means of preventing the reoccurrence of
a debt-deflation depression. According to Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray,
the danger is that policy may not downsize finance and replace money
manager capitalism. Moreover, we need a permanently larger fiscal pres-
ence, with more public services. His advice to President Obama is to dis-
card all of former U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson’s actions. Wray
believes that we can afford any necessary spending and bailouts, and that
these actions will not burden our grandchildren. 
The interrelated factors largely responsible for America’s “golden age”
immediately following World War II include pent-up demand, the baby
boom, moderate inflation, and Big Government. Based on the teachings of
Hyman P. Minsky, Wray also includes factors such as a high wage / high
consumption bias, a high government debt ratio and low private debt,
external markets for U.S. output, and a government spending “ratchet”
where spending grows faster than GDP. He notes that policy aimed to push
private investment introduces inflationary pressures, promotes inequality,
and creates excessive productive capacity. Ensuring a sustainable growth
path will require job creation, income growth, debt relief, public infrastruc-
ture investment, more public services—and a greater role for government.
Wray proposes policies for both the near and far terms. Policies to deal
with the immediate crisis include liquidity injection by the Federal Reserve,
a “too big to save” doctrine (owners of troubled institutions either inject
their own capital or face receivership and bankruptcy), tax relief that
strengthens household balance sheets, fiscal stimulus, mortgage relief, and
higher budgets for the pursuit of fraud. Policies to encourage sustainable
economic growth in the medium to long term include green initiatives,
combined with the stoppage of commodity markets speculation; payrolltax reform; the provision of federal funds to states that take actions to lift
regressive taxes and reverse trends of rising inequality; health care reform;
government control of social services such as education, health care, and
military services; financial reform; and job creation. 
Fear of large deficits relates to inflation, investment crowding-out, and
insolvency. According to Wray, this fear is without merit. The key to miti-
gating inflation is to ensure that the correct nature and composition of
government spending grows at a pace consistent with the level of fiscal
stimulus. This is achieved with a federal jobs program. Obama was on the
right track when he set a goal of creating millions of new jobs, says Wray,
but he should provide jobs without limit to anyone willing and ready to
work. This policy action is not inflationary if there is a fixed price, the
quantity is floated, and the government offers a living wage, with benefits,
that does not bid against the private sector. A government jobs program
would operate like a buffer stock—expanding in a recession and shrinking
in a boom.
The solution to resource crowding-out is not to hire away the
resources needed by the private sector. In terms of financial crowding-out,
says Wray, the theory that government deficits push up interest rates and
replace private investment is wrong. Central bankers target the short-term
interest rate, so higher rates in response to budget deficits are merely a pol-
icy decision. Moreover, Treasury debt is an inconsistent policy variable,
because the market dictates the interest rate on each maturity. In terms of
insolvency, a sovereign government that issues its own floating-rate cur-
rency can never become insolvent in its own currency. Therefore, analogies
to household budgets are completely erroneous. In conclusion, says Wray,
we must envision a new form of capitalism that is more economically,
financially, socially, politically, and environmentally sustainable.
As always, I welcome your comments and suggestions.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
March 2009
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Introduction
Perhaps the only silver lining in the current global crisis is that economists
and policymakers have rediscovered the benefits of Big Government. To be
sure, the neocons, who have been running government even as they rail
about its evil nature, never really intended to reduce its role. As I have argued,
they simply changed its constituency: a government of the rich, for the rich,
and by the rich (Wray 2005; see also, Galbraith 2008). Still, they proclaimed
that Big Government is bad, then set out to govern in such a manner that
everyone would agree with them. But, as common wisdom teaches, there
are no atheists in foxholes. We all became Keynesians again as we instinc-
tively turned to Big Government for help. In truth—as Margaret Thatcher
famously said in another context—there is no alternative.
There is still, however, a great danger. Strong forces are aligning to
steer policy down the wrong path. Some of those responsible are simply
self-interested predators (in James K. Galbraith’s terminology); probably
the best example is the continuation of former Treasury Secretary Henry
Paulson’s attempts to preserve the outsize role that Wall Street has played
in recent years. As I will argue, public policy ought to be aimed in the oppo-
site direction: to downsize finance. Others responsible for policy change
simply misunderstand the scope of the problem as well as the policy options
at hand. For example, even President Obama continually frets about the
impacts that an appropriately sized fiscal stimulus might have on budget
deficits and financial burdens of future generations. I will try to calm such
fears. We can afford any necessary spending and bailouts, and these will not
burden our grandchildren.
Of equal importance, we need to formulate policy that not only resolves
the current crisis but also puts in place a financial and economic structure
that is conducive to what Hyman P. Minsky called tranquility. As Minsky
The Return of Big Government always warned, stability is destabilizing, so if we manage to restore stability
while retaining the current “money manager” regime, we only guarantee
that another systemic crisis will rock our world in a few years. In other
words, we need to take this opportunity to replace money manager capital-
ism with another form that promotes economic, financial, and environ-
mental sustainability. That is, I think, what President Obama means by
“real change.” 
Minsky saw this crisis coming as early as the late 1950s. Some have
called the current crisis the “Minsky moment,” but actually it is more accu-
rate to recognize this as the culmination of the “Minsky half century.” What
we need now is the “Big Government” Treasury to ramp up spending to
prevent “It” (a debt deflation–led depression) from happening again. The
federal budget deficit will grow toward a trillion dollars annually, allowing
the private sector to strengthen its balance sheet by running budget sur-
pluses. The (discretionary) fiscal stimulus package now appears to include
almost $800 billion in new spending and/or tax cuts; the “automatic stabi-
lizers” already in place will add to that. A trillion here, a trillion there, and
we will be able to avoid another “great” depression.
But there is a real danger in the belief that all we need is a big but short-
lived fiscal stimulus. As I will argue, what we really need is a “ratchet”—
more government spending in the “depression” to provide needed effective
demand, and then continued fiscal stimulus in the recovery to ensure that
we can operate the new plant and equipment that will be put in place.
Further, we need a permanently larger fiscal presence that will provide
good jobs and better infrastructure, and needed public services. While we
should applaud the Obama team’s promise to spend more on infrastruc-
ture and “green” investments, critics are right that such policies will leave
women as well as many people of color behind. But we also need more
public services in the areas of health, education, childcare, and eldercare—
areas that can potentially employ millions of women. The early postwar
period is often called America’s “golden age”—and it was for a lot of us,
especially educated white males. America can do better than that. We will
need millions of new, permanent jobs for those who are chronically left
behind, even during rising tides.
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Why Did We Have a Golden Age?
Paul Krugman (2008) has argued that four factors were largely responsible
for the early postwar success: pent-up demand (rationing and patriotic sav-
ing during the war), the baby boom (generating spending on all the things
young people need), moderate inflation (which, in contrast to orthodox
thinking, actually is good for business), and Big Government (“military
Keynesianism” increased demand). To these, based on Minsky’s teachings,
I would add (in no particular order): 
High wage / high consumption bias.Strong unions pushed up wages,
allowing growing domestic consumption based on income (not
debt); this also promoted labor-saving innovation, technological
advancement, and all of that good stuff.
High government debt ratios / low private debt. We emerged from
World War II with private balance sheets stuffed full of very safe
government debt; in Minsky’s terminology, we had a “robust”
financial sector with highly liquid assets (this is also related to
Krugman’s “pent-up demand” point).
External markets for U.S. output. The United States could sell abroad,
thanks to the Marshall Plan, which provided the financial where-
withal to purchase U.S.exports (also adding to demand for U.S. out-
put was the destruction of productive capacity by war in Europe and
Japan). 
Government spending “ratchet.” Government spending grew faster
than GDP, supplementing private sector demand and thereby keep-
ing labor, plants, and equipment operating close to full capacity.
No doubt there are other factors, but these lead to several relevant points.
While much postwar “Keynesian” policy tried to push private investment
(tax credits for saving and investing), some economists (Evsey Domar,
Minsky, Harold Vatter and John Walker; see Wray 2008c) recognized that
this is problematic, for several reasons that I can only briefly summarize
here. First, it tends to introduce inflationary pressures, since, at the aggre-
gate level, prices of consumer goods must be marked up above the wage bill
required to produce those goods. This ensures that the workers who pro-
duced the goods cannot consume all of them, leaving consumption goodsfor workers (and others) in other sectors to consume (Minsky 2008b).
Second, it tends to promote inequality, since wages and profits in the
investment sector are higher due to greater economic power (of unions and
firms). Third, it creates excessive productive capacity unless demand rises
sufficiently (with capital-saving innovations, it is likely that the   supply-side
effects of investment outstrip the demand-side or multiplier effects, leav-
ing capital idle and depressing demand). Finally, as emphasized by Minsky
(2008a), modern investment goods are expensive and long-lived, requiring
complex financial instruments and relations. This is related to the point I
made above: investment-fueled economic growth will at the same time
tend to produce growing private-debt ratios that increase financial fragility.
For this reason, Minsky always argued that government-spending-led
growth is more sustainable because it allows private sector spending to
grow based on income rather than private debt.
We now see why the four factors I listed above are interrelated. As
Krugman has argued, it was World War II and the subsequent cold war that
ended the depression and set the stage for the “Golden Age.” The govern-
ment deficit reached 25 percent of GDP during the war, providing a mas-
sive amount of private sector saving in the form of safe financial assets that
strengthened balance sheets. From 1960 onward, the baby boom drove
rapid growth of state and local government spending, so that even though
federal government spending remained relatively constant as a percent of
GDP, total government spending grew rapidly until the 1970s (see Wray
2008c). This pulled up aggregate demand and private sector incomes, and
thus consumption. Note that in spite of the conventional wisdom, the early
postwar “Keynesian golden era” of rapid government growth actually resulted
in very small budget deficits, because robust economic growth generated
rising tax revenues. Further, growth reduced government debt ratios—in
effect, Treasury bonds were “leveraged” to generate the postwar boom.
Economists have long recognized a macroeconomic turning point in
the early 1970s. Government spending began to grow more slowly than
GDP; inflation-adjusted wages stagnated, poverty rates stopped falling,
unem  ployment rates trended upward, and economic growth slowed. Inten  -
sified efforts to promote saving and investment (on the belief this would
restore growth) only made matters worse: saving depressed demand, and
investment produced fragility. Another major transformation occurred in
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the 1990s, with innovations in the financial sector that increased access to
credit, as well as changed attitudes of firms and households about prudent
levels of debt. Now consumption led the way, but it was financed by debt
rather than by growing income. Robust growth returned, but this time it
was fueled by private sector deficit spending. The rest, as they say, is his-
tory: a thrift-financed real estate construction boom (and then collapse); a
NASDAQ dot-com IPO boom (then bust); a securitized NINJA (no income,
no job, no assets) subprime boom (and crisis); and pension fund–fueled
index speculation in commodities futures (Wray 2008a, 2008b). With no
more bubbles on the immediate horizon, we are left with debt deflation
and deepening recession.
Where do we go from here? Private sector–led expansions are (almost)
inherently unsustainable because they generate growing debt burdens that
eventually must be reversed. (I admit, however, that I continually underes-
timated the willingness of America’s firms and households to accumulate
debt—I started projecting this current crisis about 10 years too soon.) It is
clear that what we need now is job creation, growth of income (especially
wages), and debt relief, all of which will put household finances on better
footing. We need public infrastructure investment—not private invest-
ment—as well as more (and better) public services. Virtually all economists
now favor a bigger role for government; however, most see this as a tempo-
rary fix. What I am arguing is that we need a big and growing govern-
ment—the ratchet—to generate a sustainable growth path. 
We need a growing role for government. But will we be able to afford
it? Will it cause inflation? Won’t government spending crowd out private
investment? What about government solvency? Isn’t government subject to
a budget constraint, just like households and firms? These are questions
addressed in the final section.
Policies for the Short Run
We first must deal with the burgeoning crisis, which requires a big and
immediate intervention. Here I will not delve deeply into the causes of the
financial meltdown—interested readers are referred to my various Levy
Policy Notes and Public Policy Briefs, which foresaw and then analyzed the
processes that created a “perfect storm” (the title of a piece I wrote in2003—perhaps a wee bit prematurely?). We must remember Minsky’s
admonition that “stability is destabilizing”—successful resolution of this
crisis and restoration of a semblance of stability will encourage a return to
risky practices. That is why we also need a package of policies for the
medium- and longer-term. While we can never go back to the New Deal
institutions and regulations, we can certainly learn from them. We had a
long run of good times after World War II, and Roosevelt’s New Deal had
a lot to do with that. The unraveling of the social and economic fabric over
time—partly in response to deregulation but mostly due to “natural”
profit-seeking behavior of innovative firms—created conditions in which
“It” became possible again. Hence, what we want to do is to promote insti-
tutions, regulations, and practices that can constrain modern capitalism’s
inherent thrust toward fragility. 
Here is a brief list of policies to deal with the immediate crisis:
(1)  Liquidity.While it took too long, the Federal Reserve (Fed) finally figured
out that it must lend without limit to any financial institution. Forget
collateral—it doesn’t matter (we are on the hook, anyway, due to
deposit insurance as well as the public interest in squelching a spread-
ing meltdown). Forget the auctions—just lend at the discount window.
Provide loans of different maturities to meet the needs of the borrow-
ing institutions, and to manage interest rates so as to control the term
structure. Note that the Treasury’s recently announced plan to issue
bonds with a wider range of maturities does not help unless the Fed
manages the interest rates on all the maturities. So, we need policy
coordination. Raise the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s
(FDIC) limit to infinity (we are going to bail out the depositors any-
way). Continue to increase coverage to money market funds and other
kinds of deposits. If the Fed had done this at the very beginning, the
liquidity crisis would not have been nearly so bad.
(2) Paulson plans. Paulson famously demanded $700 billion from
Congress with no strings attached, and insisted that the sky would fall
the next day if he didn’t get the money. Wrong. It didn’t. He next tried
to buy bad assets—but as we (now) know, bad assets on the books of
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banks total $3 trillion to $5 trillion, so he would need much more than
Congress had allocated. Then he proposed injecting capital into the
banks. Ditto: too little, too late. So his “final” plan was to use the cap-
ital to promote banking consolidation, picking and choosing which
favored institutions would get subsidies to take over other institutions
(Papadimitriou and Wray 2008). Who needs socialism when Wall Street
runs the Treasury? Advice to President Obama: discard (and reverse
where possible) all of Paulson’s actions. And, please, we do not need to
create a “bad bank” in order to concentrate the toxic waste. We already
have plenty of them: Goldman Sachs, Citibank, and Bank of America
are our concentrators.
(3) Insolvency of financial institutions. Paulson’s premise was that insol-
vency is a matter that must be resolved immediately. But that is false.
Financial institutions can stay in business for years with more liabili-
ties than assets. If the economy recovers, many of those assets will rise
in value; the insolvency problem can conceivably solve itself if we have
sufficient patience. That is how we managed the epidemic of bank
insolvency in the early 1990s. Unfortunately, if you leave the crooks in
charge of insolvent financial institutions, they like to “bet the bank”—
to take huge risks, since they have nothing to lose. That is what hap-
pened to thrifts in the 1980s, and it appears to be happening right now.
So here is what we need to do: (a) insist that the owners of troubled
institutions inject their own capital (to put some skin into the game);
and (b) if they refuse to put in enough, the appropriate regulatory
agency (the FDIC in most cases) moves in and places the institution in
receivership. Management is replaced; the institution is closely super-
vised, with tight constraints on growth imposed; and then we hope for
economic recovery. Hopeless institutions will have to be dealt with—but
rather than adopting Paulson’s consolidation approach, we should close
the institution, sell off the assets, and pay off the depositors. This could
include hundreds of institutions. There will be collateral damage—for
example, pension funds hold stocks in such institutions, so we will need
to bail them out through the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation,
which will itself go bankrupt so we will need to bail that out, too. 
The total cost may be in the trillions of dollars. Can we afford it? SeePublic Policy Brief, No. 99 13
below. Finally, there has long been a doctrine of “too big to fail,” which
counseled that we can let small banks fail but we must always bail out the
big ones. This current crisis has revealed such policy to be nonsense. I
advocate a “too big to save” doctrine. The big Wall Street banks serve
almost no public purpose: let them fail. Save the small- and medium-size
banks that actually know how to lend to firms and households.
(4)  Immediate tax relief. There is a growing consensus for an immediate
payroll tax holiday: stop collecting the old age, survivors, and disabil-
ity insurance (OASDI) portion of the payroll tax from employers and
employees. Both the employer and the employee pay 6.2 percent (the
self-employed pay 12.4 percent), up to a current maximum taxable
base of $102,000. Approximately 163 million people paid Social Security
taxes on earnings in 2007. Total tax revenue raised was $656 billion,
which amounts to an average of $4,025 per taxpayer. A tax holiday
would provide immediate tax relief to workers and their employers,
injecting $12.62 billion into the economy each week. Take-home pay
would rise by an average of $77 per week, with an equivalent saving
per worker for each employer. A worker who earned $40,000 annually
would get a tax cut of $2,480 per year. Just as important, that worker’s
employer would also benefit from $2,480 in tax relief, which may help
keep workers on the job. If desired, we can phase the tax back in when
the stimulus is no longer needed (although payroll tax reform is
included in my longer-run policy proposal).
(5)  Fiscal stimulus. Many argue that government spending is more stimula-
tive than tax cuts, since part of the tax cut is saved. So what? Households
have been spending more than their incomes for a dozen years, and the
geniuses on Wall Street have wiped out nearly half of those households’
retirement savings. (Another silver lining: privatization of Social Security
is, thankfully, a dead issue, as no one in his right mind would trust Wall
Street with the third leg of his retirement stool.) The answer is that we
need both: a payroll tax holiday to strengthen household balance sheets,
and more government spending to restore the economy. To do imme  -
diate good, we need spending that can get under way quickly. Increased
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needed. It is also important to help state and local governments, which
are reeling from the double whammy of higher expenses and plum-
meting tax revenues. They need at least $400 billion in “block grants”
(perhaps based on population) to be spread among them. Maybe some
of the money would be targeted, to be spent on public infrastructure
projects either already under way or on the shelf but ready to go; some
would go to Medicaid; and some would come with no strings attached. 
(6) Mortgage relief. Millions of homeowners are underwater, with out-
standing mortgages greater than home value, and it will get worse.
Millions were duped into subprime loans at resetting rates they can-
not afford. Millions more used homes as cash-out ATMs, have fallen
behind in payments, and now face job loss or at least reduced hours
and wages. Economic recovery, job creation, a payroll tax holiday, and
rising wages will all provide relief because they will make it easier to
service debt. But more direct measures will also be required. The FDIC
was the only Bush Administration agency with any clue about what
needs to be done to stop the death spiral. Many mortgages need to be
refinanced on more favorable terms; that includes lower, fixed mort-
gage rates as well as reduction of the principal to reflect current mar-
ket value of the properties. Because most mortgages were sliced and
diced to serve as collateral for underlying securities, it is very difficult
to renegotiate terms. Congress wants to allow judges to change mort-
gage terms; perhaps there is a way to go further, and to force securities
holders to accept losses (again, there will be collateral damage that will
have to be resolved.) Failing that, existing mortgages can be paid off,
with new mortgages issued. If securities holders cannot be forced to
take losses, the Treasury will have to take them. “Socializing” losses in
this manner is not normally a good thing, but these are not normal
times. A debt deflation is not the right time to worry about moral haz-
ard. Who will issue the new mortgages? Let’s renationalize Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac and put them to work in the public interest. This
time, they should be run by civil servants earning normal General
Schedule salaries, they should hold the mortgages, and they must adopt
reasonable underwriting criteria. Homeownership is not for everyone,
and at least some owners will opt for economist Dean Baker’s “rent toown” plan. Give them back their down payments (plus fees paid to
mortgage originator swindlers), let them stay in their homes paying fair
market rents, and give them a couple of years to decide whether they
really want to be homeowners. Finally, Congress is moving to give up
to $15,000 in tax credits for the purchase of a home. Bad idea. This will
encourage house flipping (you buy mine, I buy yours, nobody moves,
and we reverse the deal later). It is far better to offer jobs and good
mortgages to anyone who wants them.
(7)  Jail the crooks.Vastly increase the budgets (and hire criminologists) for
pursuit of fraud all the way up the real estate food chain: mortgage
originators, property appraisers, risk-rating agencies, accountants,
and—most importantly—the Wall Street money managers who cre-
ated this mess.
Longer-Term Policy to Promote Growth and Stability
For the medium to longer term, we need to put into place policies that will
encourage sustainable economic growth. Here I discuss eight important
areas for reformulation of policy.
(1)  Green policy. Economic sustainability will require paying more atten-
tion to the environment. This is an area that Obama has already iden-
tified as important, and I have no special expertise here. I would simply
caution that economic recovery could reverse the course of oil prices
(likely back toward $80 per barrel). Some combination of pressure on
our oil producing “friends,” subsidies for alternative energy and con-
servation, and energy costs relief for low-income households will be
needed. We will also have to stop the speculation in oil and other com-
modities, by closing loopholes in the futures markets and prohibiting
pension funds from index speculation (Wray 2008b).
(2)  Payroll tax reform. Payroll taxes are regressive, discourage work and
employment, are inflationary because they add to labor costs, and
reduce American competitiveness against all countries that do not tax
wages. Further—and this might come as a shock to readers who have
Public Policy Brief, No. 99 15The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 16
bought into the claims made by intergenerational warriors financed by
the Concorde Coalition—the taxes are far too high, generating revenue
that is about one third higher than what’s needed to offset all OASDI
(Social Security) spending. As part of my package of policies to deal
with the current crisis, I recommended a payroll tax holiday. To pla-
cate those who fear the “unfunded entitlements” of baby boomer
retirements, we can have the Treasury directly make all Social Security
payments during the holiday (they do it anyway, even when we are not
on holiday). They can then credit the OASDI Trust Fund with the one-
third-extra tax revenue that would have been received (once again,
they do that anyway, since the Trust is just a Treasury promise to pay
Social Security payments when they come due). Now, what should we
do when the holiday comes to an end? I have the audacity of hope to
believe that we can end the intergenerational fighting, that we will
finally recognize that promised Social Security benefits can and will be
paid as they come due, and that we can stop the nonsense about accu-
mulating Trust funds (Treasury IOUs issued by the Treasury to itself)
to take care of future retiring baby boomers (Papadimitriou and Wray
1999). Unless baby boomers can eat OASDI Trust Fund IOUs, they are
no better off if the Trust is filled with quadrillions of Treasuries than
they would be without a trust fund at all. So let us stop pretending, and
recognize Social Security promises for what they are—that is, commit-
ments by a sovereign government to credit bank accounts on schedule.
Let us accept the social commitment to ensure a decent retirement for
all Americans (which will depend on our capacity to produce the real
stuff retirees will want, plus our ability to import) and come up with a
better way to redistribute resources from those of working age to those
of retirement age. After all, that is really what payroll taxes are all
about: taking income away from those accruing it to ensure they don’t
consume everything. It makes far more sense to tax all sources of
income, in a progressive manner, in order to share the burden of tak-
ing care of a growing elderly population. Can we financially afford
growing numbers of baby boomer retirees? Of course we can, as
argued below. Can we ensure they get enough real resources to achieve
the standard of living they expect at retirement? Probably, but that has
nothing to do with affordability or payroll taxes. All it requires is thatwe (a) provide sufficiently large credits to their bank accounts, and (b)
put at their command a sufficient quantity of real resources. 
(3)  State and local government revenue. The “devolution” of the federal gov-
ernment that has taken place since the early 1970s puts more responsibil-
ity on state and local governments, but without the necessary funding; in
response, they have increased (mostly) regressive taxes such as sales and
excise taxes. These governments need immediate assistance, because tax
revenues are plummeting. Once the crisis is past, we also need to encour-
age them to move away from regressive taxes (in the average state, poor
people pay twice as much of their income in state and local taxes as do
the rich). I suggest we offer federal government funding to states that
agree to eliminate regressive taxes (except for those imposed on “sin”
goods such as alcohol and tobacco), on a dollar-for-dollar basis.
(4)  Inequality. The rise in inequality is a major contributing factor to the
run-up in household debt: stagnant real wages for most Americans in
the face of rising expectations (thanks largely to emulation of
Hollywood and Wall Street) encouraged the debt binge. Hence the
current financial crisis is indeed related to the rise in inequality—both
because of stagnant incomes at the bottom and because of soaring
incomes at the top. Many processes contributed to rising inequality; I
have already alluded to the reversal of the early postwar trend that saw
poverty rates fall by half by the mid 1970s—and then virtually no fur-
ther reduction since. I won’t go into all of this in detail, but the empha-
sis on stimulating private investment as well as the public subsidies for
consolidation and the promotion of finance over industrial enterprise
all encouraged rising inequality. The weakening of unions played an
important role—a problem Obama has promised to address. What
Jamie Galbraith has called the “predator state” has also played a major
role, as Dick Cheney and his minions have richly rewarded their
friends. So, we need to reverse those trends. Thankfully, Wall Street has
already taken care of most of the excessively rich, downsizing their
wealth and incomes to an extent not seen since 1929. Now we only need
to drive a stake through the heart of finance to ensure it cannot recover.
Next,we need to get incomes rising at the bottom—more on this below.
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(5)  Health care. While much is made of the “unfunded entitlements” of
the public leg of the health care stool, the other two legs—the
employer-funded leg and the patient-funded leg—are also broken and
collapsing. In our “global economy,” one could not imagine a worse
design for health care than the one that has evolved in the United States
—highly inefficient and employment-killing, as it saddles employers
with exorbitant costs. Sooner or later, it will be reformed. We might as
well do it now: provide nationally funded and universal access to rea-
sonable health care, with a much smaller privately funded system for
nose jobs and other elective treatments. Note: nonprice rationing will
be necessary. It makes no sense to devote most health care spending to
the last dying gasps of life. Those unwilling to accept rationing of care
can buy extra insurance and build up savings.
(6)  Infrastructure and social spending. I have argued that government spend-
ing needs to operate like a ratchet: it should increase in bad times to get
us out of recessions, and increase in good times to generate demand for
growth of capacity. What should we spend on? Infrastructure, social pro-
grams, and jobs. We’ve got a $2 trillion public infrastructure deficit—
and that’s just to bring America up to the minimal standard expected by
today’s civil engineers. Our standards used to be higher. I can remember
when all the kids expected levitating bullet trains coast to coast and per-
haps even rocket ship transport to Martian sea vacations by the early 21st
century. Here we are a half century later, stuck in traffic in gas-guzzling
dinosaurs that aren’t that far removed from the finned Buicks our grand-
parents drove. If anything, our relative dearth of public services is even
worse than it was when John Kenneth Galbraith first brought it to our
attention in the 1950s.1 And our needs are much greater: wealthy (and
aging) societies need services, many of which are best provided outside
the private (profit-based) sector. The long-fashionable belief that the
market knows best, that it is well suited to provide everything from
elder care to health care to education, now seems crazily improbable.
Heck, the market couldn’t even do a relatively   simple thing such as
determine whether someone with no income, no job, and no assets ought
to be buying a half-million-dollar McMansion with a loan-to-value ratio
of 120 percent. Jimmy Stewart’s heavily regulated thrifts successfullyfinanced more housing with virtually no defaults or insolvencies, and
with none of the modern rocket-scientist models that generated the
subprime fiasco. Let the market mow lawns and determine toothpaste
flavors; leave the important stuff—education, child and elder care,
health care, military and security services, and other social services—
to government.
(7)  Financial reform. The market has decisively spoken: It is not capable of
self-regulation. It cannot tell who is creditworthy. It cannot be trusted
to innovate new financial products. It cannot be relied upon to deter-
mine compensation schemes. It makes terrible credit allocation deci-
sions. It cries out for downsizing and heavy-handed reregulation. In
short, it is telling us that government of Goldman Sachs, by Goldman
Sachs, and for Goldman Sachs is no way to run a country or an econ-
omy. President Obama needs to listen.
(8)  Jobs. I’ve saved the most controversial proposal for last. I believe that
anyone who is willing and ready to work should be able to work. I even
believe that able adults oughtto work, rather than relying on handouts.
Further, I think these principles are consistent with capitalism and
with the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which includes the right to a job. Here are the problems: first, capital-
ism has no internal processes to ensure full employment of labor
resources; and second, policy always intervenes to ensure that full
employment will not be reached, on the belief that it would generate
inflation. John Maynard Keynes (1964) explained the first point: firms
hire the amount of labor they need to produce the amount of output
they expect to sell. The existence of unemployed labor will not induce
employers to hire more, even at lower wages, for the simple reason that
additional production is not warranted by expected sales. The second
point was developed as Karl Marx’s “reserve army of the unemployed”
argument, updated as a Phillips Curve trade-off, transformed as Milton
Friedman’s natural rate hypothesis, later bastardized as the Lucas “sur-
prise”hypothesis, then rejected by real-business-cycle claims, and finally
revived as the New Monetary Consensus Taylor rule. Transcripts from
Federal Open Market Committee meetings conclusively demonstrate
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that the Fed fights against falling unemployment by raising its target
interest rate in an attempt to slow economic growth. Whether these
policy actions have the desired effect is beside the point. What is clear
is that policymakers oppose providing sufficient jobs to satisfy
demand, on the belief that if everyone is working, inflation will result.
Let that sink in for a moment: if everyone is gainfully employed pro-
ducing the stuff we Americans want to consume, that will be more
inflationary than an economy in which we maintain, say, 10 percent of
the employable population in enforced idleness, subsisting on hand-
outs and producing nothing of use. Only an economist could love such
an outrageous proposition. It sounds silly because it is. (The British
economist Joan Robinson used to argue that one should study eco-
nomics in order to identify the lies economists tell.) I do not have the
space here to explain what is wrong with the conventional views or to
detail an alternative. Let me just say that Obama is on the right track
when he sets a goal of creating millions of new jobs, many of which
will be created through programs modeled on the New Deal. He can
and should go much further; there is no reason to constrain the sup-
ply of jobs. Provide them, without limit, to anyone willing and ready
to work. Give people useful things to do (see above for ideas). And here
is the most important thing to do to ensure this will not be inflation-
ary: Set a fixed price (nominal wage) and float the quantity (hire those
that show up to work). Offer a living wage and a package of benefits
but do not bid against the private sector if it is willing to pay more. In
this way, the government’s jobs program will operate like a buffer
stock, expanding in a recession, when private jobs are scarce and pri-
vate sector wages are falling; and shrinking in a boom, when the pri-
vate sector bids workers away. This also makes the government’s
budget move countercyclically: more spending in a recession, less in an
expansion. One key to ensuring that government spending is not
  inflationary is to make sure it does not increase demand beyond full
employment. The jobs program I am describing here is an automatic
stabilizer: spending increases up to the point of full employment, and
then no farther. It provides full employment without generating infla-
tionary pressures. (But can we afford it? You betcha. See below.)This package of policies will help to restore sustainable economic
growth, putting America on a new path to an even better Golden Age. It
will reduce inequality, shift the emphasis away from private investment and
toward consumption (out of earned income, not debt or welfare) and pub-
lic spending, reduce the role of high finance, and provide better services
and more secure retirements for our aging baby boomers. Still, as Minsky
argued, we have to be diligent,because the stability created by these policies
will encourage experimentation by profit seekers to push risky practices.
This means that the policymaker’s work is never done. New challenges will
arise—but that is no reason to forego Golden Ages. 
But Can We Afford Big Government?
Many on the Obama team still worry about the long-term impacts of cur-
rent budget deficits, and are afraid of the deficit growing too big. I suspect
that a large part of the reason can be attributed to Rubinitis (better known
as deficit-phobia). Why, in the face of the biggest economic catastrophe this
nation has faced since the 1930s, would Obama lose his courage? The three
“ayes” have it: inflation, investment crowding-out, and insolvency. I will try
to calm those fears.
First, inflation: price pressures can arise from many sources—excess
demand, commodity price hikes, bottlenecks, wage or profit pressures, com-
position of demand (trade surpluses and private investment tend to be infla-
tionary for reasons mentioned above), and so on. Most fear that too much
government spending will drive demand beyond full capacity, generating
wage and price pressures. However, in the current circumstances, that is
highly unlikely, with global demand plummeting, unemployment rising, and
commodity prices busting. Still, I have called for faster growth of government
even after this crisis passes. So the key is to ensure that government spending
grows at a pace just consistent with the required level of fiscal stimulus. 
Further, it does make a difference where government demand is
directed—to avoid bottlenecks,to add to productive capacity, toward under-
utilized resources, and toward resources whose prices are rising at less than the
average rate of price increase. Right now, it probably doesn’t matter too much
what the government spends on (the often quoted Keynes statement about
digging holes comes to mind), but for the longer run, the composition and
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nature of government spending is critical. This is for two reasons. First, to
maintain public support for its policies, Big Government has got to spend in
a way that has obvious benefits for Americans. Second, government has to
avoid spending that leads to accelerated inflation. To be sure, moderate and
  stable inflation is not a bad thing—the no-longer-fashionable New Monetary
Consensus wrongly interpreted both theory and evidence to support the erro-
neous argument that moderate inflation hurts growth—but rising inflation is
not acceptable. Can we have the audacity of hope to believe that government
can formulate a policy that ensures just the right amount of noninflationary
spending? Yes, we can. As discussed above, a comprehensive jobs program that
fixes the wage but hires all who want to work does exactly that. Note that the
program, by definition, only spends on underutilized resources (those who
are unemployed), adds to productive capacity (workers do useful things), and
targets a resource whose price increase is below average (the wage is fixed,
with only occasional adjustments—much as the minimum wage is now peri-
odically adjusted upward).
The second reason is investment crowding-out. There are two main
kinds of crowding-out: resource and financial. If the government were to
hire away all of the competent engineers, investment projects that required
engineers could get crowded out for the simple reason that the government
has an unlimited checking account and can always win any bidding war. At
full employment (as in World War II), additional government hiring crowds
out private hiring. The solution to resource crowding-out is pretty simple:
to avoid it, don’t hire away the resources the private sector needs. When the
economy is well below full employment, this is easy enough; when it is
close to full employment, care is required. 
Usually, however, economists worry more about financial crowding-out,
which can occur even with unemployed resources. There are different 
versions, but the most important ones boil down to the argument that 
government deficits push up interest rates as government borrowing com-
petes with private borrowing. Government will win the competition
because its borrowing and spending are not interest-sensitive. By contrast,
the types of private spending that are sensitive (supposedly, investment and
real estate spending) will be reduced. For a long time, economists of the Big
Government persuasion argued that empirical results are mixed—we find
many cases of rising budget deficits and falling interest rates, and fallingbudget deficits and rising interest rates—so even if the theory is correct, the
real-world results don’t necessarily comply. But it is simpler than that: the
theory is just plain wrong. All central bankers everywhere now admit that
they target the short-term interest rate; and they hit their targets within a
self-determined margin of error. It makes no difference whether the budget
deficit reaches a Japan-like 10 percent of GDP (with zero interest rates), or
a United States–like 25 percent of GDP (during World War II, with inter-
est rates at 3/8ths of 1 percent), or a United States–like budget surplus of 2
percent of GDP (under President Clinton—accompanied by rising rates!).
The Fed determines the short-term interest rate. Period. Yes, it might raise the
rate in response to budget deficits, but that is a policy decision. If Congress
doesn’t like that, it should change the instructions it provides to the Fed.
There are two further, somewhat more technical, points to be made.
The first is that the central bank operates with an overnight rate target, but
it can choose the maturity it likes; indeed, Chairman Ben Bernanke’s Fed
experiments with longer maturity targets, a policy labeled “quantitative eas-
ing.”Thisseems important because one objection is that the Treasury issues
longer-term debt, and while it is true that the central bank sets overnight
rates, longer rates are “market determined” and crowding-out in the longer
maturity markets is still possible. However, the maturity of Treasury debt
is a policy variable—and there is no reason in principle why the Treasury
could not operate only at the short end (even overnight debt!) to avoid
crowding-out. Unfortunately, as mentioned above, the Treasury is now plan-
ning to issue an even wider range of maturities. This does have the advan-
tage of giving the market a safe asset with the desired maturity. However,
the Treasury’s plans include letting the market dictate the interest rate on
each maturity. In present circumstances, when the Fed is trying to bring
down longer rates, the Treasury’s approach is inconsistent. It makes much
more sense for the Fed to manage the term structure of interest rates by pro-
viding loans of reserves at a variety of maturities, and offering interest rates
on deposits of reserves at different maturities. The Treasury could then
stick to the short end of the market, where the Fed sets the overnight rate—
ending any confusion over the links between deficits and interest rates.
For those who are still skeptical, let me move on to the second, more
important, point. Government spends by crediting bank accounts (bank
deposits go up, and bank reserves are credited by the Fed). All else being equal,
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this generates excess reserves that are offered in the overnight interbank lend-
ing market (the “fed funds market” in the United States), putting downward
pressure on overnight rates. Let me repeat that: government spending pushes
interest rates down. When they fall below the target, the Fed sells bonds as a
higher-interest-rate-earning alternative to excess reserves—thus pushing the
overnight rate back to the target. Continuous budget deficits lead to continu-
ous open market sales, causing the New York Fed to call on the Treasury to
soak up reserves through new issues of bonds. The purpose of bond sales by
the Fed or the Treasury is to substitute interest-earning bonds for undesired
reserves—to allow the Fed to hit its interest rate target.2We conclude: govern-
ment deficits do not exert upward pressure on interest rates—quite the con-
trary; they put downward pressure that is relieved through bond sales.
On to the final phobia: insolvency. Let me state the conclusion first: a
sovereign government that issues its own floating rate currency can never
become insolvent in its own currency.3The U.S. Treasury can always make all
payments as they come due, whether it is for spending on goods and services,
for social spending, to hire workers, or to meet interest payments on its debt.
While analogies to household budgets are often made, these are completely
erroneous. I do not know any households that can issue Treasury coins or
Federal Reserve notes, though some try occasionally (counterfeiting, but that
is risky business). To be sure, government does not really spend by direct
issues of coined nickels. Rather, it spends by crediting bank accounts. It taxes
by debiting them. When its credits to bank accounts exceed its debits to
them, we call the difference a budget deficit. The accounting and operating
procedures adopted by the Treasury, the Fed, special deposit banks, and reg-
ular banks are complex, but they do not change the principle: government
spending is accomplished by crediting bank accounts. Government spending
can be too big (beyond full employment), it can misdirect resources, and it
can be wasteful or undesirable, but it cannot lead to insolvency.
Constraining government spending by imposing budgets is certainly
desirable. We want to know in advance what the government is planning to
do, and we want to hold it accountable; a budget is one lever of control. At
this point, it is impossible to know how much additional government
spending will be required to get us out of this deep recession. Whether the
Obama team finally pushes through Congress $850 billion worth of useful
projects, or $1.5 trillion, voters have the right to expect that the spending iswell planned and that the projects are well executed. But the budgets for
these projects ought to be set with regard to desired results and project
competencies—the ability to successfully execute the plans—not out of
some preconceived notion of what is “affordable.” Our federal government
can afford anything that is for sale in terms of its own currency. The trick
is to ensure that it spends enough to produce sustainable growth and other
desired outcomes while at the same time ensuring that its spending does
not have undesirable outcomes such as fueling inflation or taking away
resources that could be put to better use by the private sector.
In conclusion, we face huge, but not impossible, challenges. We need to
resolve the current crisis, which has many facets: a financial crisis, a home-
ownership crisis, a jobs crisis, a retail sales crisis, and so on. We also need to
deal with longer-term problems: inequality, environmental challenges includ-
ing global warming, an aging society, and restoration of rising living standards
for most Americans (note that this requires a change in our style of life or it
will dangerously conflict with environmental sustainability). At the same time,
we also have to dispel a large number of bogeymen: debt burdens, crowding-
out, the inflation-unemployment trade-off, and federal government insol-
vency. Finally, we have to try to formulate policy solutions that do not simply
set us up for another crisis. This requires not only that we understand the
processes that brought us to the precipice but also that we envision a new
form of capitalism that is more economically, financially, socially, politically,
and environmentally sustainable. That is change we can believe in.
Notes
1.  The view that America had an abundance of private goods and serv-
ices but was seriously deficient in its supply of public infrastructure
and services was put forward in John Kenneth Galbraith’s The Affluent
Society, published in 1958.
2.  In the old days, these reserves earned no interest. Bernanke changed
that, effectively eliminating the difference between very short-term
Treasuries and bank reserves. This move also entirely eliminated the
need to issue Treasuries—but that is a topic for another day.
3.  While such a currency is often called “fiat” (which is somewhat mis-
leading for reasons I won’t discuss here), I prefer “sovereign currency.”
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